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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM c. HOYLE et al, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
-vs-




BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CASE NO. 16133 
16134 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment (the 
actions being consolidated) to hold §20-3-14, 1 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 unconstitutional and to require the De-
fendant to place their names on the ballot for Congress 
as independent candidates since plaintiffs were impe-
cunious and the statute requires payment of a filing fee 
which cannot be waived by Defendant. 
1. "Any candidate filing a nomination paper or acceptance 
···· . shall pay to the filing officer a fee for such 
filing. The fee to be paid shall be one-fourth of one 
percent of the total salary for the full term legally or 
customarily paid by such office •.... but such fee shall 
not be less than $5.00, except filing for all present 
offices shall be $1.00. " 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court held that §20-3-14, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, violated Article I, Section 4 of thE. Utah 
c . . 2 d onst1tut1on, an ordered that plaintiffs-appellanb n~~ 
be printed on the ballot as independent candidates fcc.· 
Congress. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant requests this Court to 
reverse the decision of the District Court and to de-
clare §20-3-14, Utah Code Annotated, constitutional in 
view of the provisions of §20-7-20, 3 Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as applied to these plaintiffs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs-Appellants are in all respects 
qualified to be independent candidates for election to 
the House of Representatives except that they did not 
pay filing fees at the time of filing nominating peti-
tions with the Secretary of State. Mr. Hoyle had 
borrowed funds which were deposited with the Clerk of 
the Court pending decision of this case by agreement of 
counsel. Mr. Bangerter was unable to borrow any money· 
It was stipulated that each candidate was impecunious. 
2. 
3. 
" •...•. No property 
person to vote, or 
this constitution." 
. ed of afi: 
q ualification shall be reqmr d .0 
. . vide i hold office, except as pro 
" •.... The voter may also 
of any person for whom he 
-2-
. . the na~' insert in writing.'· .. " 
desires to vote .. ·•· 
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ARGU!·1ENT 
POINT I 
THAT SINCE THE UTAH ELECTION LAW, ( §20-7-20, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, PROVIDES THAT 
WRITE IN VOTES ARE COUNTED WITHOUT PAYMENT 
OF ANY FEE BY A CANDIDATE FOR OFFICE OR HIS 
SUPPORTERS, THE UTAH REQUIREMENT OF THE PAY-
MENT OF A FILING FEE BY A CANDIDATE WHO 
WISHES TO HAVE HIS NAME PRINTED ON THE 
BALLOT (§20-3-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) 
DOES NOT VIOLAIE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES. 
It is clear that §20-3-14, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, requires the payment of a filing fee by a candidate 
for puolic off ice who wishes ·to have his name placed on 
the ballot. It is equally clear that the Secretary of 
State has no statutory power to waive the requirement in 
any case, including cases in which a candidate is wholly 
without funds to pay the required fee, or who may be 
"impecunious", however the term may be defined. Under our 
state law, however, write-in votes are allowed and are 
counted without any requirement of payment of a fee by 
the person whose name is written in, by his supporters or 
by tne voter, (§20-7-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). 
4. 
Amendment XIV 
" ..... No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of ~itizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without_du~ p7ocess 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdi.ction 
the equal protection of the laws." 
-3-
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Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 39 L.Ed. 2d. 702 , 
94 S.Ct. 1315, decided by the Supreme Court of the United 
States on March 26, 1974, states as a federal constitutional 
requirement that while a state may properly impose a re-
quirement that a candidate for public office pay a reason-
able filing fee, it must provide for a reasonable alterna-
tive means of ballot access by a serious indigent candidate, 
otherwise there would be a denial of equal protection of 
the law required by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Cali-
fornia law held to be unconstitutional had no way what-
ever for the candidate to get on the ballot without pay-
rnent of a fee, If a write-in vote was to be counted, the 
candidate had to file a statement at least eight days prior 
to election and pay a filing fee, 39 L.Ed.2d, 702, 705. 
In Bullock v. Carter, 405, U.S. 134, 31 L.Ed.2d~l,! 
I 
92 S.Ct. 849 (1971) the Court had previously held the Texas 
law unconstitutional since payment of a high filing fee 
was the only way a candidate could gain a position on a 
party ticket. The Court held that the statutory alterna-
tive of filing a petition with the proper number of signa- 1 
tures without payment of a fee which would place the name 
of the candidate on the final 
alternative to the fee payment 
nab le ballot, was not a reaso 
d · d te would since the can 1 a 
not run as the candidate of his chosen party, and ~at in 
be more cruc ,:,_ 
some parts of Texas the primary election may 
than the general election. 
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These two eases represent what the Supreme Court 
of the United States has determined as the standards per-
mitted with respect to filing fees-the fee must be reason-
able-there must be ballot access for a serious but indigent 
candidate. 
In this case, the concurring opinion in Lubin, 
by Justice Blackmun, in which Justice Rehnquist joined, 
is particularly important. " •.. I would regard a write-in 
procedure, free of fee, as an acceptable alternative. Prior 
to 1968 California allowed this ...... But the prior fee re-
quirement for the write-in candidate was incorporated into 
the State's Election Code in that year. ...•.• it is that 
addition, by amendment, that serves to deny the petitioner 
the equal protection guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. II 39 L.Ed.2d. 702, 712. 
It is submitted that there are many state in-
terests served by keeping a ballot within manageable pro-
portions, and these interests are recognized in the opinions 
cited. In the case at bar the candidates sought to run as 
independent candidates, The party ;restrictions referred to 
in Bullock are not therefore applicable. The Lubin de-
cision seems to imply that the California fee (which is 
apparently based on 2% of salary and is therefore more than 
the Utah fee) is not unreasonable in itself, since the pe-
titioner was indigent and could pay no fee whatever, the 
issue is open. What is clear is only that payment of a 
fee may not be the exclusive method of ballot access. 
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In the absence of a definitive ruling, the 
write-
in provisions of the Utah law must be deemed 1 a egally and ! 
constitutionally permissible alternative. 
POINT II 
THAT SECTION 20-3-14, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, BY REQUIRING A CANDIDATE TO PAY A / 
FILING FEE DOES NOT IMPOSE A PROPERTY 
QUALIFICATION UPON A CANDIDATE FOR PUBLIC 
OFFICE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 
4 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
An examination of the Official Report of the Pro-
ceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention (Star 
Printing Co. 1898) shows that the major portion of the de- i 
bates dealing with voter qualification dealt with woman's 
sufferage. By the time that our Constitution was adopted, 
and as reflected in the Enabling Act, universal adult male 
sufferage was already achieved and apparently taken for 
granted. The only things respecting the property qualifi-
cations for holding office or voting were respectively 
whether the statement that no property qualifications for 
office or voting belonged in Section 4 of Article I and, 
as demonstrated in the final choice of phrase in Section 4 
and in Section 7 of Article IVS as adopted, which restricted 
voters to tax paying property owners in elections levying 
special taxes. The thinking of the members eemed to be 
that if a tax were to :Oe levied, those who owned propertY .. 
' g a S~' 
S. ArticleIV, Section 7. "Except in elections.~~vy~~onsba:· 
tax or creating indebtedness, no property q~al1 11 ica 
required for any person to vote or hold office. 
-6-
• 
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upon whic!1 the tax was to be levied should decide whether 
or not a special tax purpose was worth the expenditure they 
were called upon to pay. 
The source of the filing fee paid upon filing 
is not now, nor has it ever been a material item in deter-
mining a candidate's qualification. 6 If a candidate has 
any real support it would appear that the supporters could 
contriirnte the funds, and in fact this is one of the pur-
poses of the fee-elimination of non-serious candidates. 
There is no state requirement that a candidate 
for office own either real or personal property, nor i.Eh 
there any requirement that he file a financial statement, 
or do anything else to disclose his wealth or lack thereof 
to the public. 
It requires only a general knowledge of American 
history to ascertain the reasons for constitutional pro-
visions such as Article I,S§ction 4. The American people 
found out several hundred years ago t~at we do well to pre-
vent any aristocracy from looking to our best interest 
whether this group is established on roal blood lines, or 
some principle of theology, or on possession of money, or 
property. 
6
"igualified" means.possessed of certain qualities o~1 caga5cities, app v. Post Printing, 111 Colo. 492, 144 P.2d 98 ,9~ , 
" ..... a qualified voter ... is .. a qualified elector who has 
met the additional requirement ..... of payment of all taxes 
assessed against him .... " Watson v. Sportenborg County Bd. 
~~_.:._ 141 S.C. 347, 139 S.E. 755. 
-7-
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It is not reasonable to believe that our Legisla-
ture would seek to pass an election law establishing 
weal th as. a basic requirement for office in view of our 
political history as English Colonies. It may be argued 
that the effect of the law is to exclude a poor man from 
running for office, but it would be equally reasonable to 
conclude that the effect is to limit the ballot to serious 
candidates who have some realistic chance of election or 
at least to those who may have an impact on the public or 
upon other candidates to influence the position taken on 
one or more current political issues. 
No test, particularly a property test has been 
imposed in violation of Article I, Section 4. 7 
The vast majority of states have upheld the imposi-
ti on of reasonable filing fees against many cons ti tuional 
challenges. (See. Annotation 89, A.L.R.2d 864). The reasons 
for up!1olding the legality of the fees have been set out in 
Lubin v. Panish and in Bullock v. Carter. The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized in both of these decisions that 
a State has a legitimate interest in regulating the number 
of candidates on its ballots, in preventing the clogging 
of its election machinery, in avoiding voter confusion, and 
assuring that the office holder elected is the choi~ ~a 
majority or a strong plurality of the voters. 
7. Tygeson v. Magna l·Jater Co., 119 U.274, 226 P2d 127 · 
-8-
"""" 
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It is respectfully submitted that the District 
Court misconstrued the purpose of our Constitutional pro-
vision of prohibiting a property or religious test for 
office. 
CONCLUSION 
While ballot access must be afforded in some 
manner to an indigent candidate and a state may not limit 
a ballot only to those persons who pay a filing fee with 
their own funds or with funds provided by their supporters, 
a state has a right and a duty to protect its ballot. 
The means chosen by the State to achieve such 
protection, so long as the means are reasonable, are con-
stitutional when a reasonable alternative, such as our 
write-in provisions, are available to a serious indigent 
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